It was first in 2006 Lebanon war that the drawbacks in Israeli army were exposed. 15 years later, the emergence of new flaws in the same section proves the necessity of rooting the challenge.
A great deal of the problem appears to be related to a lack of preparation and coordination among army sections and their intelligence affiliations. The outcome of local polls in Israel show that there is still a feeling of humiliation about the failure in Lebanon second war.
A two-sided continence equilibrium has formed between Israel and Hezbollah following the military developments in that conflict. As a result, both sides appear disinterested in a massive conflict, while the eruption of clashes is still a potential incident.
Revised operational planning, soldier training, the deployment of sophisticated equipment, and online information differentiates a new war with the last ones. 2006 war was the scene of a series of intelligence bugs in Israeli army that impacted the war itself.
A professional deficit and inefficacy in waging ground combat exposed Israeli army’s drawbacks during the 2006 War. There was no other option, but a basic transformation. As a result, Israeli troops began focusing on training combat and multi-force battalions on a regular basis. The decision aimed at preparing for combined engagements with other branches of the IDF.
With Hezbollah’s style of action evolving through the years, the Israeli army is focusing efforts on the next conflict by shoring up border defenses. Israeli army recognised that while Hezbollah had previously secured dominance by launching missiles until the penultimate day of battles and continually fighting the army, it would now conduct pre-emptive assaults.
The fields of battle after Lebanon second war clearly exposed Israel’s inability to control the impacts of war. Inside and outside the country, Israeli leadership and military faced severe challenges.
Israeli Army after 2006 War
The two attacks on Gaza in the first half of 2010s served as a template for the impending battle in the northern regions. The Israeli army understood the necessity to construct a robust border defense.
The major concern is about the ground army which has never participated in a significant offensive. Its persistent reticence to participate in exercises and related operations, vacating the scene for the air forces, means the Israeli army still deals with fundamental drawbacks.
The Israeli military is likewise concerned about using ground forces in conflicts because their effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated. The military officials have been steadily increasing the Air Force’s capability instead. The reality of war, however, shows that the gaps of the ground forces can never be filled fully by the air force.
Intelligence is also a further defective sphere. Gaza battles have exposed a discrepancy in information performance due to the army’s inability to collect or refresh information in time.
Furthermore, there are concerns about the deterioration of intelligence activities. The Israeli army may win the next battle on an operational level, but it would be meaningless without intelligence achievements. The result may prove nothing more than a 2006 defeat.
The most significant benefit of that Lebanon battle in 2006 has been the total and unparalleled peace it has produced in the north. Yet, the most significant disadvantage of the same battle has been Hezbollah’s military power.
The Israeli army started an unprepared offensive with Beirut in 2006, and it made up the plans there. Tel Aviv looked for a glimmer of triumph but was unable to secure it.
15 years later, a similar war can result in a similar result. Israel’s military agenda failed in covering the necessities in a region always ready for a war.
