American Withdrawal from Iraq; A Detested Fear of Separation

American withdrawals from the countries it had invaded and stayed for years have rarely been less disputing than the onset of the war and occupation. Afghanistan example, as the most recent demonstration of the US non-involvement initiative, proved a disastrous departure seeing the entire two-decade programs of nation-building and societal overhaul vaporize in less than three months. The country seems to have been frozen during the 20 years of American tenure, and the post-August 2021 Afghanistan is barely a far cry from pre-October 2001 nation.

The first phase of American presence in Iraq and ramifications of its withdrawal eight years after the outset of war gave rise to public and global concern and dismay about similar events following a potential second departure. Shortly after the first American withdrawal of troops in 2011, Iraqi daily Azzaman spotlighted concerns that bore a rationale, proved during the time. “The government hopes its decision not to let U.S. troops stay in the country will spur armed groups to join its national reconciliation efforts. Many hope it will pull the carpet from underneath insurgent groups who have been tenaciously resisting U.S. presence in the country. For them U.S. presence has always been part of the problem and not solution.”
The overall public view in Iraq, notwithstanding the past experience, defies the American involvement in the country’s governance and societal developments. Provoked by the recent regional escalations following the outbreak of Gaza war, the disillusionment with US troops accentuated in Iraqi society.

Iraq’s divided political, religious, and sectarian state deepens the concerns about a looming American departure 10 years after starting a second deployment of troops to the country. Despite facing recurrent security challenges and passing over the ISIS surge, the most vigorous rise of extremist terrorism in power, Iraq still suffers from a lack of organized and mighty armed forces, resilient enough to fill the gap of American departure. The country is loaded with massive and scattered military groups each affiliated with a regional or local faction. These militias are ideologically divided enough to wage a fresh civil war, leading the county into yet another surge of extremism and bloodshed.

The political matter is hardly less of a helter-skelter in Iraq with multiple Shiite and Sunni groups yearning for power, utilizing whatever method or tools to provide themselves with the recipe of a more dominant show in the power struggle. Governments and legislatures have failed in their bid to reinforce the governing system leading to a condition where insurgence, contention, and resignation turned to the key words explaining the political concept of the country. No political faction, sectarian group, or religious bloc is powerful or popular enough to originate a monopoly of power like what Taliban did in Afghanistan.

Political division originates from and exacerbates the national character and being of the country. The post-2003 Iraq has failed to come up with a national identity around which organization of a stable power-sharing system and social culture could settle down. Having long suffered the obliteration of a nationalism during the Saddam Hussain Era, successive Iraqi generations were never taught or directed to have a sense of national unity. The deficiency steered the country into the sort of local strives from which ISIS was born.

Iraq has been the stage of a regional power struggle in which Iran and the United States play the leading roles. The recent spike of hostilities that kicked off after American positions were targeted by Iranian proxy militias truly epitomized the long years of foreign intervention in the country. Both countries have served the country in its battle against extremism and containing the local strives. The Iraqi public, despite that, has figured out the pretext both countries are using to extend their presence and involvement in the country.

Tehran has always been a pressing force for the withdrawal of the United States alleging it with ignorance towards the autonomy of the country and a long-time failure to advance the security apparatus of the nation. American involvement, nevertheless, has been supported by most governments craving the financial and security patronage of Washington to retain their grip on power. American presence in Iraq is legally based on the U.S.–Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement introduced in 2008 and reinforced in 2021. Tehran, on the other hand, has no direct involvement in Iraq using its military proxies to enforce plans and strategies.

Sudani administration in Iraq, following a pressure by the public and Iran, announced the necessity of American troop’s departure from the country. The two countries are to start a negotiation process from which an exit timetable is expected. Sudani, like his predecessors, is showing a political plasticity to thwart the pressures for the time being, hoping a termination to the hostilities in Gaza will deflate the tensions in Iraq. Having to confront with either the United States or Iran would be the last thing Sudani would like to face in an already crisis-stricken political governance of the country.

A balance of power between Iran and the United States may serve the administration, and not necessarily the nation, in Iraq. Former governments have dodged on embracing a popular call to reinforce the political independence for three main reasons. First, they relied on foreign political, military and financial assistance to reserve and extend their tenure in a country stricken with service delivery failures and public dissatisfaction. Second, a constant fear of the revival of extremism in form of ISIS or any new violent brand, considering the diverse religious and sectarian factions armed and active in the political stage, pushed back the pursuit of a cessation to foreign intervention. Third, an unbalance of power may have ignited violent confrontations, fueling the political, regional, religious, ideological, and sectarian discrepancies in Iraqi society. Foreign powers have levers to contain the administrations, groups, and individuals from using violence in a bid to consolidate their grip on power.

The calamity and concerns over the withdrawal of remaining 2500 US troops from Iraq is cultivated by the American failure to bolster the nation with a powerful military force and prompting civil reforms to instigate a national unity. Washington’s pretext to stay in Iraqi soil would not work if the state and the nation were resolved in thwarting the foreign engagement in local affairs and promote their sense of national identity. The process evokes similar trends in American interventions where failure to enhance the societal, economic, and security conditions is a consistent motif. Washington, in effect, has set the scene for Iraqi nation in a way that both options, Withdrawal or remaining, would not serve their desires and interests.