In an analytical report published this Monday, Foreign Affairs discussed the consequences of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Iran, noting that while this event has various implications for Iran, Tehran is actively developing new strategies to restore its influence in Syria. Consequently, to reduce tensions in Syria and the broader Middle East, the United States should pursue a path of engagement with Iran, rather than confrontation.
Challenges and New Strategies for Iran
Despite facing numerous challenges, Iran is adapting its strategy to maintain its influence in Syria. One of Tehran’s efforts is to engage with Kurdish groups in Syria, who, although not directly challenging Assad, played key roles in the conflict, especially in fighting Sunni extremist groups and controlling much of northeastern Syria. Prior to Assad’s fall, Iran-backed forces had retreated from key positions in eastern Syria, particularly in Deir ez-Zor near the Iraqi border, handing control over to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are primarily Kurdish. This shift reflects Iran’s attempt to position itself as a potential partner for the Syrian Kurds, particularly given Kurdish concerns that U.S. support for the SDF may wane with a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House.
Iran may also explore the possibility of engaging with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and leverage the anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian sentiments among the Syrian rebels for its benefit. Although HTS leadership has expressed a reluctance to engage in conflict with Israel, ongoing Israeli strikes and territorial advances in Syria could lead to a shift in the group’s position.
Additionally, Iran may seek to build new relationships with Shiite and Alawite minorities in western Syria who fear discrimination and repression by Sunni extremists. By aligning with these groups, Iran could create a network of loyal forces and proxies to maintain its influence in Syria even without Assad’s regime. Iran might even organize hundreds of Assad’s defected soldiers who fled to Iraq into an anti-revolutionary Syrian force, potentially providing them with a role in the future of Syria.
Opportunities and Challenges for the United States
The fall of Assad and the loss of Iran’s influence in Syria present both opportunities and significant challenges that require active U.S. engagement. First, continued U.S. support for the Syrian Kurds is crucial. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurds, have been a key ally in the fight against ISIS. However, recent clashes with Turkey-backed rebel groups have forced the SDF to halt operations against ISIS. U.S. support, including financial, political, and diplomatic assistance, strengthens the Kurds against such threats and prevents Iran from exploiting the emerging power vacuum in Syria.
At the same time, the U.S. should encourage Israel to de-escalate its operations in southwestern Syria. Since Assad’s fall, Israel has expanded its presence beyond the Golan Heights, occupying deeper areas of Syria and justifying this expansion on security grounds. However, any prolonged Israeli occupation could alienate Syrians and provide Iran with a pretext to revive its anti-Israel agenda in Syria.
The United States should also work with its allies in the Middle East and Europe to promote an inclusive political dialogue among all Syrian factions. The power vacuum left by Assad’s departure could exacerbate competition among various factions and ethnic and religious minorities, making support for inclusive dialogue crucial to the creation of a representative government that preserves Syria’s territorial integrity and protects minority rights. This approach would also reduce the likelihood of Iran or other foreign actors manipulating minority groups for their own gain.
Ultimately, to ensure security in Syria, the report noted that diplomatic efforts to prevent further instability in Iran are equally essential. Iran’s increasing insecurity after Assad’s fall may push its leadership toward escalating activities that destabilize the region, such as strengthening proxy forces in Iraq and Yemen or exacerbating sectarian tensions in Syria. Therefore, the United States should engage Iran in regional negotiations on Syria’s future, addressing Tehran’s security concerns while encouraging its leadership to de-escalate tensions in other areas. This strategy could help reduce Iran’s disruptive influence in Syria and the broader Middle East, and potentially open the door to broader diplomatic talks between Washington and Tehran on issues such as Iran’s nuclear program.
