In an analytical report published this Monday, Foreign Affairs discussed the consequences of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Iran, noting that while this event has various implications for Iran, Tehran is actively developing new strategies to restore its influence in Syria. Consequently, to reduce tensions in Syria and the broader Middle East, the United States should pursue a path of engagement with Iran, rather than confrontation.
The report emphasizes that the collapse of Assad’s regime not only exposes Iran’s vulnerabilities but also creates significant new challenges, threatening both its regional influence and the stability of the Islamic Republic. One of the key issues Iran faces is the restoration of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities. Syria has long served as a vital logistical hub, connecting Iran to the Mediterranean, allowing the transfer of weapons and logistical support to Hezbollah. With the collapse of Assad’s regime, this supply line has been severed, disrupting the geographical connection of the resistance axis. Consequently, Hezbollah, which had already been weakened by the 14-month war with Israel, now faces the daunting task of rebuilding without direct logistical support from Iran.
Furthermore, the fall of Assad has highlighted ideological and sectarian rifts among Iran’s allies, which could further undermine the cohesion of the resistance axis. Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis all view this event as a major defeat. However, Sunni groups supported by Iran, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, have congratulated the Syrian rebels, particularly Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist group, for their victory over Assad.
Losing Syria could also diminish Iran’s credibility with its regional partners in Iraq and Yemen. Iran’s failure to decisively intervene in defense of Assad could create doubt about its commitment and ability to support its neighbors. Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s former prime minister and a close ally of Iran, expressed surprise in a TV interview after Assad’s fall, questioning how Iran and Russia had changed their positions and failed to support Assad.
Additionally, Iran’s position in competition with Turkey is also threatened. Turkey’s strong support for Syrian rebels has shifted the regional balance of power. Under Assad, Iran’s extensive presence in Syria helped mitigate Turkey’s regional ambitions. However, since Assad’s downfall, Ankara, now the main backer of Syrian rebels, has replaced Tehran and Moscow as the dominant foreign power in Syria, and Turkey’s influence in the region is expanding. This situation has raised increasing concerns in Iran that Turkey, emboldened by Tehran’s weakened position, might seek to expand its influence at Iran’s expense in Iraq, Lebanon, and the South Caucasus.
In Iraq and Lebanon, Turkey might strengthen its support for Sunni groups against Iran-backed Shiite factions. In the South Caucasus, Turkey’s push for a Zangezur corridor, a strategic transit route connecting Turkey through Armenia to Azerbaijan, threatens Iran’s land access to Armenia, a strategic partner for Tehran in maintaining regional influence and trade.
The collapse of Assad’s regime has also fueled domestic discontent among Tehran’s loyalists, some of whom openly criticize the government, calling it a strategic mistake. Such dissent presents a serious challenge for a regime heavily reliant on passionate domestic support. Moreover, there is concern that Sunni extremist groups in Iran’s restive southern regions, such as those inhabited by Arabs and Baluchis, may become emboldened by the victory of like-minded groups in Syria, potentially leading to more unrest in a country increasingly under pressure.
