In an effort to protect its most pressing national interests and expand its clout in the regional and trans-regional developments, Saudi Arabia has resorted to a drastic buffering in its ties with various international and local powers. Therefore, the state’s current foreign and regional policies form a selfish and self-serving agenda that prioritizes Saudi State’s, and not even the nation’s, plans and interests. The focal point, while unofficially leading the wider region, is attempting to secure a place at the international platform by serving as the representation of a secure and commercially interconnected region.
Considering distinct Saudi objectives and weak spots, the Kingdom has developed financial affiliations with several worldwide entities on the international scene as a result of its new self-serving political playbook. Saudi Arabia has shifted its reliance on Washington to exploiting its economic rivalry with Beijing. Rulers in Riyadh are convinced that an effective negotiation with both sides of the competition, enjoying leverages en route, along with a strategic game-play keeps the Kingdom away from the dust of the US-China battlefield.
Nations around the green continent have taken heed of the dynamic transformation of Saudi policy agenda. Throughout the recent years, officials, economic figures, and high-rank politicians have visited Saudi Arabia recurrently to address regional, and ensuing global, peace and equilibrium issues, notably the Gaza crisis. Iran, its expanding regional influence, and the proxy activism of Tehran has also been a hot topic in these meetings. In addition to initiatives like the European Union’s inaugural Gulf plan, which was released two years ago, these affairs acknowledge Saudi Arabia’s significant influence in the Middle East and reminisces its formidable commercial and political capabilities.
Saudi Arabia has managed to demonstrate its new Middle East clout on the international scene thanks to developments in global stage. The kingdom’s policies following Washington’s retreat after 2019 demonstrated both dissatisfaction and mistrust. Riyadh attained an assurance that it could endure despite losing close allies. The country presented itself as a vital ally for superpowers once more without leaning on an exclusive partner. Instead, it looked for an independent, opportunistic diversification of allies making use of a number of newly emerging partners. A fresh reality that a number of these nations, notably China and Russia, began strongly appealing to the monarchy to become the new focal point of Middle East facilitated the Saudi political campaign.
Saudi Arabia promoted the new world order based on rejecting the traditional superpower model with great enthusiasm, seeing themselves as able to act as a link between various poles of the world. Bin Salman, Saudi de-facto ruler, rejected the idea that Arab world needed to side with more established Western allies in their competition with east-bloc powers. Rather, they chose alliances based on how best to serve their goals and grand policy playbooks. Riyadh’s focus on shaping Russian energy strategy because of its influence on the worldwide market provides a good example of Saudi divergence from old partnerships. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the White House and other European administrations made repeated calls for Saudi Arabia to stand with the Western alliance against Russia, only to see the Kingdom actively hedging on its political discourse on the matter.
It is evident that Riyadh is making efforts to safeguard its ties with Beijing, a crucial ally for its financial stability, even in the face of criticism from Washington and other western capitals. China has become the primary purchaser of Saudi Arabian crude oil, with the latter exporting an astounding 25% of its oil there. Along with the European countries, China has been one of Saudi top two business and economic companions during the last four years. China became an effective propellant for Saudi scale-up in science and technology and generously granted the transfer of expertise, even for critical technologies that traditional allies have been unwilling to offer, in the fields of cyber-security, AI, defense, and biotechnology. China also provided its Middle East ally with techno-scientific partnership. The prospect of unrestricted patronage and collaboration led the Arab rulers to exhibit a bold readiness to breach Washington’s boundaries in order gain access to Chinese technology. It embraced Huawei’s leadership in the building of 5G networks and disregarded American worries that these may turn into access points into their defense equipment. Beijing is an alternative possible ally of Riyadh in the nuclear energy sector, providing the latter with a leverage in its talks with Washington.
Multipolar world provides Saudi leaders with the ability to seek commercial ties with other global powers and eventually establish its own foreign policy, rather than mindlessly adopting US preferences. Saudi Arabia envisions a future in which superpowers are conditioned by intermediate powers, who favor cooperation for containing libertine political or economic powers. In order to preserve its strategic dominance, it seeks to make use of its advantageous position between three continents. The kingdom has consequently been seeking to further enhance globalization and multiple polarities and shield against a resistance by the west. On the other side, western powers are concerned about dependency on eastern newly-formed powers and the ramifications of unchecked globalization.
A security oversight by Washington has long curbed European governments’ activism in the Middle East forcing them to adopt a peripheral strategic position. Their major concentration was on the Mediterranean and on matters like energy, economy, culture and social contribution. This led to a lack of deep and strategic clout over the region, particularly after Arab nations emerged as major providers of capital and other forms of financial assistance to Europe in the wake of the worldwide economic downturn of the late 2000s. Furthermore, nations in the continent have had little reason to work via the EU, particularly in light of the region’s long-standing reluctance to interact with the complex, overly institutionalized methods by which the Union does its business.
Most calculations by states in Europe on their ties with the Middle East states were altered by Washington’s retreat from the area and the clear strategic prominence of the Arab nations of the Middle East, on top of which, Saudi Arabia. The European Union is striving to remove long-standing, seemingly insurmountable, barriers to the EU-GCC free trade deal in order to take advantage of these potential. In the meantime, an optimism about Riyadh’s contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East and the world fueled the thirst for recalibration of the ties with Saudi Arabia.
The Europe was late in figuring out the significance of the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, falling back on China and Russia on multiple sectors. The recent policy transformation, nonetheless, is not good news for the United States that meant to restore its place in the dynamics of the region following years of trailing behind eastern powers. The winners might be the nations in the Middle East for whom the market is getting wider and wider and a subtle policymaking may put many of them on the dynamic track of growth and stability.
| The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Al-Sarira. |
