Kurdistan region of Iraq has been a point of enigmatic questions for most observers and analysts who don’t closely follow the event in the country. Against most states in the region, Iraq has a regional government with autonomous legal rights and political factions working separately from federal administration. The Kurdistan regional government was used to having its own financial and political ties with foreign countries and exploit its abundant hydrocarbon resources. The circumstances, however, changed for the region and its ruling governance in recent years.
Kurdistan region has benefited from a substantial degree of independence from the Baghdad-based administration during the years following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The region forged a separate and structured course in multiple sectors by taking advantage of the flexibility granted by the new constitution ratified two years after the American-led invasion. It negotiated oil contracts, formed a separate legislature, and developed diplomatic ties with other countries. Disputes and instability rife raged across the other regions of the country during the recent years, especially following the defeat and retreat of ISIS militants. The condition instigated the minds over the prospect of a self-reliance for Kurdish nation and a full sovereignty for the Kurdish administration. Iraq appeared to be on the verge of disintegration.
The current state of affairs, over five years later, is very different. A more stable circumstance for the central government creates an opportunity for the unified administration to deflect the independence bid by the Kurdish population. Baghdad is back in the driver’s seat and thwarts any move to assume its authority over any part of the country. There is constant stress, with Iraqi military forces starting attacks on facilities in the Erbil province last year. Earlier this year, Tehran also added lethal bombardment of missiles, targeting zones that were believed to be resided by Israeli intelligence agents. While the Iranian offensive hit the media, and under its dust, the local government kept up with a separate initiative aiming at straining the economy of the region and influencing its political apparatus.
The Federal Supreme Court rendered two significant decisions a month later ordering Erbil to hand over the profits of hydrocarbon sales and tasked the federal government with the payments of the entire Kurdistan administration personnel. Another verdict restructures the upcoming parliamentary vote in the region. According to the Supreme Court order, members of racial and religious minorities lost their 11 seats in the parliament.
The ruling was responded fiercely by the prime minister of Kurdistan region who claimed that the federal government and its apparatus employ iron fist against the region and its people. Trying to expose the administration’s hypocritical approach, Barzani said that the role of savior does not fit into those who used to strangle the region. Iraqi Chief Justice who also leads the FSC has close relations to the Shite Coordination Framework, a group of partisan factions supported by Tehran that now run the federal government. His detractors charge him with polarizing the judiciary by employing it as a weapon against the opposition groups and activists.
The region’s hydrocarbon regulations were repealed three years ago by the court which in turn sacked speaker of parliament as a fierce show of power. It also thwarted efforts by the Sadr party to create an alliance on its way to form administration, an evolution of events that would result in the exclusion of Coordination Framework from power. These rulings are definitive since in the legal apparatus of Iraq, the FSC is the last circle, giving the losers little opportunity to hope for a legal reconsideration. The power players in Kurdistan region have a share in part of the issues that Kurdistan has been facing in recent years. Due to disagreements on critical issues ranging from economic policies to security concerns and corruption cases, the two dominant political factions are severely split with the attempts to reach a settlement not successful.
Kurdistan administration faces severe financial issues. A disagreement over authority over hydrocarbon reserves has prevented Baghdad from paying the region’s fair portion of its expenses since early 2010s. KRG managed to support the people for a while by selling oil, but the pipeline was closed by a verdict from a worldwide arbitration court against Ankara, which was obtained by the authorities in the Green Zone. Kurdish struggling employees would benefit financially from this change, but the regional government is expected to vehemently object to the demand to pass over all revenues to the central government. The move would formally cement KRG’s reliance on Iraqi federal administration. Under any scenario that may occur in the coming months, Erbil’s ambitions for economic, and an ensuing political and security, independence seems to be dissolving. The FSC’s decision to take away the parliament seats reserved for racial and sectarian minority groups undermines the independence of Kurdish governing bodies in the near future.
Opponents said that the special seats, who were designated to Christians and Turkmens, five for each, and one for Armenian, did not genuinely promote the values of the people they claimed to represent. Instead, by standing in unison with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, they effectively served as actual KDP representatives.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the second powerful political party in Kurdistan, launched a legal action to start the process, hoping to obtain control over part of the members and demand systemic overhaul. It may be argued that the FSC exceeded above its legal jurisdiction and engaged in legislative action by completely doing away with designated minority membership. The disputes over the parliament seats ironically stands for a bigger trend in Iraqi political atmosphere in which various ethnic and political factions capitalize on minorities as secret leverages. The supreme court, the federal administration and both Kurdish parties attempted to utilize minor groups for partisan and political gains, rather than expanding their influence and advancing the welfare of these communities. Kurdistan’s primary challenge, as such, is not to deal with the central government’s restrictive policies, but to restore the public trust about its benevolence and honesty towards the Kurdistan region and the entire nation.
| The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Al-Sarira. |
