The Howard administration covertly sent Australian military soldiers to the Middle East months before formally declaring the country’s engagement in the Iraq war, according to recently made public cabinet papers. These disclosures, which were found in documents from 2003 and 2004, provide insight into the government’s conscious attempts to conceal the early deployment from the general public.
The documents, made public on January 1 under laws requiring the declassification of most cabinet records after 20 years, provide the first official acknowledgment of what has long been suspected — that Australian Defense Force (ADF) personnel were sent to the region well before the official announcement of the war on March 18, 2003.
Records for 2003, which were delayed in their release last year due to an apparent misplacement, were finally made public in March 2024. These records reveal that Australian forces were deployed as early as January 10, 2003, under a decision made by the National Security Committee (NSC) of cabinet. Preparations for this deployment reportedly began months earlier, with initial plans discussed as far back as August 2002.
The 2004 cabinet papers further detail the government’s efforts to manage how this information was communicated — or, more accurately, withheld — from the public. A meeting of the NSC on February 10, 2004, focused specifically on ensuring that details of the early deployment would not come to light. According to meeting minutes, departmental heads warned the committee about the risks associated with disclosing the timing of Australia’s military actions in Iraq. In response to these worries, the NSC decided to carefully manage the story of how and when Australian soldiers entered the conflict.
Before the Australian government publicly announced its involvement in the Iraq War, there had been years of conjecture that it had already committed troops to the Middle East. Critics have accused former Prime Minister John Howard and his government of misleading the Australian people, withholding critical information about the country’s involvement in a controversial conflict. These newly released records confirm that the NSC authorized the forward deployment of troops on January 10, 2003 — more than two months before the official announcement.
Additionally, the records show that these plans were not hurriedly created. As the United States stepped up its preparations for a potential invasion of Iraq, the NSC initially considered forward deployments in meetings on August 26 and December 4, 2002. By the time the January 2003 deployment decision was made, the groundwork had already been laid.
The 2004 records highlight the extent to which the Howard government sought to suppress information about the early deployment. The NSC met to consider how to respond to public questions over Australia’s engagement timetable before to the public publication of Defense’s evaluation of the Iraq operations. The necessity to handle “the specific issue of public handling of when ADF action in Iraq commenced” is stated directly in a minute from the meeting held on February 10, 2004.
The issue’s political importance at the time is shown by this degree of secrecy. The Iraq war was deeply divisive, both internationally and domestically, with many Australian’s questioning the legitimacy of the conflict and the government’s decision to support the U.S.-led invasion. Publicly admitting that troops had been deployed months earlier could have exacerbated criticism and eroded trust in the Howard government.
These revelations might stir up the already tempestuous waters regarding Howard’s handling of Australia’s involvement in the Iraq war. Criticism is aimed at a move that sends troops while public discussions are not taking place- yet. The existence of plans as early as August 2002 raises further questions about how far the government had already committed itself to the U.S.-led war well before consulting with parliament or the wider public on the issue.
The former prime minister, John Howard, has, in the past, justified his actions in going to the Iraq war as lending support to a stalwart ally in the belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. However, the absence of such weapons along with the length of the war has caused many to regard Australia’s involvement in that war as an egregious mistake.
