Afghanistan’s social and financial conditions are challenging. The situation in the nation is being made worse by natural calamities and large-scale removals from neighbor countries. The Taliban established a transitional administration and declared the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” following their mainly peaceful takeover of power in August 2021.
There is a lot less violence in Afghanistan now than there was prior to 2021. However, there have been several instances of brutal repression against supposed regime opponents. The previous government and Military force, citizens, and others seen to be support areas for the National Resistance Front are specifically targeted.
When the Taliban took power, the Afghan state took over the sanctions imposed by the US and the UN on specific Taliban members. Mullah Akhund, the prime minister at the moment, is listed as subject to international sanctions.
Sanctions have prevented the country’s approximately $9 billion in cash reserves and budget, which are deposited overseas, from being used to meet pressing humanitarian needs, particularly in the health industry. As a result, the humanitarian crisis is unstable and is made worse by natural catastrophes.
50% of Afghans live below their means, and 69% of them are unable to make a livelihood. Another 800,000 Afghans are set to be deported from Pakistan in the middle of 2024, which would make the already unstable labor market much worse. Furthermore, 43% of the population is under the age of 15. over 500 young people annually reach the age of employment. Many Afghans have been deprived of a significant source of income as a result of the prohibitions on the production of opium.
Background
The mismatch of the objectives and goals of modernization’s supporters and detractors is the primary source of the conflicts that now exist in Afghanistan. Outside forces have always exacerbated rather than resolved the issue, which initially appeared in the 1920s when conservative tribal elders opposed Amanullah Khan’s reform initiatives.
After reforming in 2003, the Taliban organization primarily used the claim that the Kabul administration were corrupt Western-imposed powers to justify their armed resistance. The Taliban have not been widely opposed, if not supported, in rural regions due to the governments’ incapacity to provide for fundamental demands in terms of social engagement, economic development, security, and access to independent justice. They have been able to progressively increase their influence as a result.
Particularly among members of the middle class in cities who had profited from restoration and modest changes over the previous 20 years, the Taliban government’s growing limitations on women and their presence in public, their schooling, and life since autumn 2021, media censorship, pressure on journalists, and persecution of former government officials have increased the desire to leave the country. On the other hand, a lot of people in rural areas believe that the new government would provide at least some stability and safety.
