Investigating Israel’s Options in Dealing with Hezbollah (Part Two)

A report by Israel’s INSS revealed that in facing Hezbollah, Israel will have limited options, most of which would never result in a decisive victory for Israel.

In a comprehensive and analytical report, the Israeli think tank INSS examined the options facing Israel in dealing with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, especially in the field of ground military invasion, most of which would not result in a victory for Israel.

Option 3: Perform a series of ground attacks

In this option, the IDF conducts a series of targeted attacks on Hezbollah compounds south of the Litani River to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and forces, and then retreats into Israel. These offensives could involve relatively large orders of battle similar to Operation Broad Pot 4 in September 1972, which involved two infantry brigades (Jolani and Paratroopers), an armored brigade (“Barrack”), and engineering and artillery forces.

While this option avoids the long-term damage to legitimacy and erosion of strength associated with previous options, it also has limitations. As seen in Gaza, offensives often have limited effect because the enemy can repair its infrastructure after Israeli forces withdraw. It is also unclear whether these incursions can restore the confidence of northern residents to feel safe and return to their homes.

Hezbollah is likely to respond with counterattacks, which could in turn lead to renewed calls for wider operations or increase public calls for an end to the fighting, neither of which would be desirable options for Israel. Therefore, though this scenario is feasible in terms of manpower, order of battle, weapons and legitimacy, it will not achieve the desired results.

Option 4: Temporary occupation of the “tactical strip”

In the past, the Israeli army referred to the plan to occupy areas overlooking the border as “proper deployment”. According to this plan, the IDF would capture areas north of the international border. This scenario also includes the destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and the removal of its forces from the region, as well as the creation of a security zone to protect Israeli towns and villages along the border. This plan addresses one of the IDF’s key challenges in defending the northern villages, the lack of defensive depth due to their proximity to the border.

It also eliminates the risk of direct attacks on Israeli settlements. Although the threat of precision-guided missiles and drones will remain, it will allow residents to return to their homes. If there is a credible threat to destroy the Shia villages in this area and prevent their reconstruction by Israel, it can put pressure on Hezbollah to reach an agreement.

This option is possible in terms of deploying forces for a limited period, availability of weapons, and preserving domestic and international legitimacy. However, this legitimacy could diminish if there is a sense that Israel intends to remain in the region for a long time.

In the end, it seems Israel should pursue a diplomatic initiative to reach an agreement, pressure on Hezbollah’s infrastructure and operatives north of the Litani River, the deployment of a strong international force – such as US forces and the French – and ending the war in the North.

If the diplomatic initiative fails, Israel must avoid inadvertently creating a “security zone.” Instead, it should prepare for a limited presence in the region, minimizing exposure to Hezbollah fire and guerrilla actions, while adopting a policy of action to prevent the rebuilding of threatening infrastructure. Unlike the years before the war, this policy must be firm and coherent in order to prevent the gradual return of Hezbollah to the borders and its unprecedented strengthening experienced in the past fifteen years.