Iraq has seen many waves of severe war and bloodshed over the last decades. A dictatorship was overthrown around the turn of the century when a US-led coalition invaded the country and toppled the ruling system in process of a few weeks. Long years of instability and civil conflict also followed, with various military factions vying for control over the country and attacking the occupying troops as well as the newly formed Iraqi military.
The establishment of the radical ISIS insurgence disrupted a temporary era of tranquility following the withdrawal of US troops. Terrorists took control of a vast portions of Iraqi soil for four years ending in 2017 when the United States, Russia, Iran and a series of other foreign military forces intervened. During the early 2020s, Iraq has been experiencing its most peaceful era in two decades until a series of confrontations between Iranian proxies and American troops following the outbreak of war in Gaza impacted the political and societal circumstance of the nation. Although it still exists in various forms, armed violence is isolated, disorganized, and infrequent. The nation is nonetheless brittle and divided, and its citizens deal with a number of pressing issues that the government finds difficult to resolve. Four years ago, the sale of crude oil was projected to provide almost all of federal income. The economy has not been sufficiently diversified or weaned off of its significant reliance on oil revenues by different administrations.
The policy resulted in a patronage-driven, obese public sector and a dearth of employment opportunities for recent university graduates, particularly for those lacking the requisite relationships and links. The economic system of the country is also vulnerable and subject to variations in worldwide oil prices and hydrocarbon policies. Apart from challenges to the future investment and strategic initiatives, the vacuum left by total dependency on hydrocarbons rendered the authorities struggling to cover costs for essential amenities or even the wages and retirees of the public services following any sharp decline in oil prices caused by regional or trans-regional escalations.
Open discord with the administration increased when public debt hit 84% of GDP and GDP plummeted by 16%. While oil prices bounced back swiftly, Iraq has found it challenging to allocate the extra revenue due to turbulent politics and successive years of economic stagnation. Iraq has abundant resources of natural gas, but it is now a major importer of gas from Iran. European allies and the United States show their eagerness to assist Iraq in achieving energy independence and ending this reliance. Yet, because of the political turmoil and societal mistrust that has occurred in the country over the last several years following the fall of Saddam Hussein, efforts to extract and process gas from the country’s oil fields have stopped. Large amounts of gas that are linked with oil production are being released out. Baghdad’s reliance on Iranian gas and energy imports persists, contributing significantly to the its increased carbon emission and severe degradation of air in certain regions. The state of affairs is a perfect example of how intricately Iraqi management shortcomings and insecurity connect with the country’s oil-reliant economic system and turbulent regional and local circumstance.
There was no strategy in place for post-invasion era of Iraq. The United States clearly knew how to win the battle in a few weeks, but it failed to win a wider war with the society of Iraq for whom the United States and its allies were occupiers. Washington frequently neglected to consider the ramifications of important choices, like an immediate dissolution of the Iraqi military or a number of measures proposed by the interim government. Among these efforts, the creation of Muhasasa Ta’ifia was one of the most significant ones.
With an election, and frequently with a great deal of contentious factional fraud and political corruption, government positions, gravy trains, and ministries are distributed among the Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni power brokers under Muhasasa Ta’ifia. Within each ethnic or religious group, voters have an array of factions to choose from, but they are not provided with a variety of policies. Muhasasa system was designed to keep the country from rupturing and dividing along the main ethnic and religious fractures, to promote cooperation among the factions, and to prevent a single faction from assuming an excessive amount of power. While it might be argued that it has partially gained success in achieving those goals, the system has also resulted in incompetent authorities, a culture of impunity, and an inept and patronage-ridden public sphere. Because of their outrage towards the ruling elite, unprivileged people have become unified across ethno-sectarian division, creating a significant new fracture. people also decry ailing economic structures, deteriorating infrastructure, inadequate delivery of services, poverty, and other issues in addition to corruptive governance.
The months-long rallies by Iraqi citizens five years ago, arranged and organized by the younger generations, conveyed their sense of estrangement from the governing establishment. Iraq had been the scene to a large and outstanding number of public protests since years before the 2019 uprising. The Tishreen Movement was massive and significant enough to overthrow Adil Abdul-Mahdi’s administration in process of a few months. Following an election more than a year later, the privileged factions were reluctant to reach a consensus on the next administration, leading to a further political impasse in 2021–2022. At an all-time low record of 41%, voter turnout, 2021 elections demonstrated the public’s rising disenchantment and annoyance with the identity politics the ruling class imposed on the society.
Although Muhasasa system is not expected to go through a transformative process in a short time, political signals along with societal pressure indicate that gradual disintegration and giving a shot to governance that is centered around ideas and plans will have a more chance to take place in Iraqi political system. Factions and parties have already begun creating coalitions outside traditional ethno-sectarian divisions. Tishreen Movement’s partisan contenders were successful in winning some seats in the parliament. Their very little chance of influencing governance at a high level is by no means at odds with the new path they paved for the introduction of a new identity politics in Iraq.
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