Saudi Arabia-Israel Normalization Agreement; A Triangle with Four Sides

The outset of hostilities in Gaza following an unexpected assault by Hamas forces on October 7 last year overhauled the dynamics of political and security developments in the whole region. The Arab community got involved in an intricate game of neutral politics and popular uproar following the Israeli intemperate campaign on Gaza in a bid to attain a goal still unknown for most observers and regional activists. Israel’s tenacious war machine may serve its still unidentified interests in the long run, but is procrastinating and waning the chances of one of the most strategic and phenomenal agreements of the 21^st century; Normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia.

Both Saudi Arabia and Israel have made it clear, before and after the outbreak of Gaza conflict, that securing an agreement in the near future is evidently a consensus between the two sides and the third party; the United States. Israel seeks to bolster its position in the region through an agreement with Saudi Arabia, already knowing its influential place in the Muslim world. Host to the two major sites of Islam, Saudi Arabia opens the gate of agreement with other Muslim nations for Israel and thwarts the regional threats like Iran. The agreement will be a turning point to the centuries-long antipathy between Muslim and Jewish communities. The religious struggle has receded in a world in which interests reshapes diplomatic and political developments.

For Saudi Arabia, normalization means ending confrontation with an indelible source of power in the region. Riyadh’s ambitious economic and investment plans necessitates de-escalation with any potential hazard, be it the Houthi rebels in Yemen or far-right extremists in Israel. Besides, the kingdom, cognizant about the American and Israeli thirst for the normalization initiative to move on, seeks security and political privileges to diversify allies on all spheres. Riyadh’s leverage is strong enough to bypass the US requirements for cutting down on the commercial and security ties with Russia and China. The local public approach towards a potential agreement with Israel might be the main hurdle the rulers will remain apprehensive about in the future.

Public Approach

Despite the strong repressive apparatus Mohammad bin Salman employs on key political and economic decision-making processes and figures, the kingdom still has stage fright unveiling critical initiatives with a curious religious outgrowth. Statistics and the results of multiple polls reflect contradictory views regarding normal ties with Israel in various spheres. Over a-third of people in Saudi Arabia favor commercial ties with Israel that serves the country’s interests. As anticipated, the share is higher among younger groups with more novel attitudes regarding development and growth.

The early data may be misleading when considering other key opinions where only 7% of the Saudi nation is optimistic about an Israeli prime minister’s visit to the country even to “attend an international conference in Saudi Arabia.” The Saudi society rejects the Israeli sports teams to attend the events and tournaments inside the country with only 13% finding it favorable. Besides, less than 14% have a positive view towards granting a permission to Israeli airlines to use the Saudi airspace.

What causes the a more conceptual confusion over the societal attitude in Saudi Arabia is where over 61% of the population are less confident with the U.S. as an ally proposing the country to preserve the chance to have other influential partners like China and Russia. The mindset, while originating from an earlier political friction with Washington, might pose as an obstacle to the negotiation process in which the United States is one of the main parties.

The Palestine issue is still a main motif shaping the social temperament over the normalization of ties with Israel. Over a-third of Saudi citizens (36%) require better economic and political rights for the people residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an important issue while a major group of others, totally representing over half of the people, have a similar sentiment. A further result, highlighting a religious orientation, calls for commitments securing the “Muslim rights at al-Aqsa Mosque and al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem.” The seemingly incompatible attitude of Saudi people speaks for a society in transition who want to have their cake and eat it.

Palestine

Unlike former Saudi prerequisites for an agreement with Israel according to which a Palestinian independent state was one of the main poles, rulers in Riyadh tempered their requirement and set them on feasible achievements. The kingdom’s acknowledgement of the realities and its will to settle the hostilities led the policymakers to adopt a realistic attitude, forgoing former idealistic fancies.

Riyadh wants a better living condition for the people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the deal. It entails improvement of critical infrastructure in these regions and better movement and access for the residents. Besides, the Israeli policies and practices must facilitate and secure the attainment of two-state solution in the future. As a first step, Israel should terminate the settlement expansion and acknowledge the Palestinians’ rights to the land. Tel Aviv should also commit to the recognition of local authorities in Palestinian lands and reinforcing the peaceful transition of power.

United States

Without the United States, its political intervention, and security and economic privileges it fuels, the realization of a deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel would be no more than a fanciful adventure. Recent disillusionments with their partners in Riyadh and Washington, following a series of rows over various issues starting from the Khashoggi case and extending to the Ukraine war and oils supply dispute, may seem an obstacle, but a deeper look sheds light on the urgency of the issue for both sides. The United States wants the deal to maintain its influence in the dynamics of the region following Trump’s disengagement policy and Biden’s failure to revitalize Washington’s role. The deal would also serve American main ally in the region, while de-escalating the disputes with another key ally.

For Saudi Arabia, a normalization agreement entails peace in the region and contributions beyond that. For Riyadh, normalization is a leverage to attain the nuclear capabilities only secured through an agreement with Washington. Above that, retaining the military and defense cooperation with Washington is still favorable for Riyadh with its thirst for the hi-tech military equipment that only the United States can supply. Nevertheless, of the three sides of a potential agreement, one is involved in a war; the outcome of war may appear as the fourth side.