How Gaza War May Overhaul Ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Seven months after the Iran-Saudi Arabia Détente, brokered by China, the reconciliation has been put to a test following the October 7 attacks by Hamas in Israel. Tehran and Riyadh displayed a similar early position, emphasizing on the necessity of restraint and an immediate ceasefire. The former’s response to the Hamas attacks was, albeit, different, hailing the assaults as a victorious mission for what they refer to as the resistance movement in the region. Footages from streets of Iranian cities showed celebration and joy by people.

On the other side of the table, Riyadh kept up with its neutral policy towards the escalation, reminiscing its positions towards other conflicts like the Ukraine war. Riyadh’s response might be characterized in the structure of its grand economic and investment projects, for which peace is the utmost priority. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, hosts the two main religious sites in Islam and negligence towards the third one, located in Jerusalem, might bear consequences locally and worldwide.

For both Saudi Arabia and Iran, Gaza war’s significance goes beyond the fatalities, forced displacements, and evolution of war conditions. Rulers in Riyadh and Tehran have long conditioned the security and economic air of the Middle East and have a leading role in scalations or de-escalations. Despite that, the non-military apparatus they employ to contain the repercussion of the conflicts is sharply divergent. Saudi Arabia adopts political and security measures cooperating with its regional and trans-regional allies in order to exert influence on the evolution of events. Tehran, lacking those levers, utilizes its long-trained and equipped militia across the region to call the shots. Given that, the future of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the way Gaza war may reshape its dynamics is in haze.

Scene 1: Convergence

The outbreak of fire in Gaza has, at first glance, provided a chance for Saudi Arabia to estimate the depth and durability of the 6-month revitalization of ties with Iran. The two sides shared close attitudes regarding the rights of people in Gaza and the disproportionate response by Israel to Hamas assaults on October 7. An Islamic solidarity for Palestine, reinforced by popular protests across the region, further amplified the cohabitation of Saudi Arabia and Iran on Gaza. For the former, though, concerns over backlash by residents following an expected turn pf policies toward the dead Palestine issue guided the strategy on the live Gaza conflict.

For Tehran, the fresh war was an opportunity to consolidate a diplomatic and political partnership with the Saudi side. Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, made a rare visit to Riyadh to attend an emergency summit of the joint Arab League-Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The summit was not fruitful for Gaza, but Iranian president made a beneficent use of it breaking the eleven-year lock of Iranian presidents in visiting Saudi Arabia.

For both Saudi Arabia and Iran, Gaza war is a fertile scene to play a proactive role in regional conflicts and solidify their key role in the Middle East. The role has always been a source of rivalry between the two sides, but the fresh détente and a shadowy Chinese role put them side by side on Gaza war. In the meantime, preserving the partnership with Saudi Arabia, despite an inherent antagonism, offered Iran incentives in the long run.

Tehran needs to keep up with the cooperation with Riyadh due to political and economic constraints. The force polished some of its policies during three months after the eruption of carnage in Gaza. Besides, Iranians are evidently looking for ways to impede an imminent normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, despite Riyadh’s ongoing assertions that the case is still open for more negotiations. Diplomatic efforts, along with paramilitary actions, are utilized by Tehran to hamper an agreement that could thoroughly overhaul the political, economic, and security zeitgeist of the region.

Scene 2: Divergence

The Saudi-Iran relationship has still been on the verge of breakdown despite both sides’ efforts to preserve the China-brokered détente. Riyadh finds Tehran responsible for the onset of the conflict by Hamas forces whether it was through supplying and motivating the group with military and intelligence resources or by avoiding to intervene and thwart its plans.

Iran-backed militia across the region have engaged in activities that further grew the concerns over a spillover of tensions from Gaza to other parts of the region. Attacks against American positions in Iraq by Kataib Hezbollah, which is under the influence of Iran, culminated in US response by targeting the group’s headquarters and offices. The fire exchange exacerbated the US troops’ condition in Iraq with the country’ legislature passing a law urging the local government to expel them.

Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen deepened the crisis assaulting trade cargos in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Eden. The escalation bore economic consequences convincing major shipment and trade corporations to divert the key waterway and accordingly, the imposition of extra expenses to the supply chain across the world. An American alliance intervention targeting Houthi positions failed to contain the threat. Israel-Hezbollah face-off across the borderline perturbed the observers further, alleging Iran with supplying the group with guidelines and strategy. The confrontations with Hezbollah have always had the amplitude to turn into a full-fledged war, blazing the region with more violence and blood.

Tehran’s response to the war in Gaza, one in which the proxy militia exert indirect pressure on Israel or its allies, was way different from the Saudi strategy which was centered on political mobilization and “active neutrality,” an approach it also employed for Ukraine war. For Saudi Arabia and its grand economic and tourism projects, the significance of regional peace and stability transcends any other political and religious agenda. Riyadh is fully aware that putting all its eggs in one basket may backfire when the security and political air of the Middle East are subject to overhaul in the future. In that framework, partnership with Tehran, despite discrepancies and rivalries, is important in realizing the diversification program in political sphere, the policy that the kingdom already implemented in economic, societal, and religious arenas. Saudi Arabia keeps the ties with the United States, while enjoying economic and security partnership with Russia and China. Riyadh is insistent on normalizing relationship with Israel while it welcomes Iran as a regional partner.

The antagonism evidently remains; yet under the shadow of shared benefits, Saudi Arabia and Iran decided to look the other way. For the Islamic Republic, ties with Riyadh means having more regional influence while thwarting the efforts to harm its interests. On the other side, Riyadh is satisfied with a neutral rival that is under Chinese influence. In any case, Saudi Arabia won’t like the Houthi missile to redirect from the Red Sea to the palm land.