Falih al-Fayyadh has allied with Sudan and started regularizing the Popular Mobilization Forces as a result of internal unrest. Which armed groups will react?
The claims made by Falih al-Fayyadh were never taken seriously by any of the leaders of the armed factions in Iraq.
The leader of the paramilitary umbrella organization Popular Mobilization Authority (PMA) is not renowned for making embarrassing public challenges. Instead of working with a powerful official or the head of Iraq’s third-largest combat unit, he prefers to quietly establish consensus as a tribal leader.
Therefore, everyone was shocked by his vehement and hostile public diatribe last month.
The Popular Mobilization, also known as Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, has to be grounded in law and be subject to the same military laws as other components of the security services, according to Fayyadh, who made this declaration during a security conference on May 20 at the PMA’s Mosul headquarters.
He said that the Hashd al-Shaabi is in the process of severing ties with the armed groups that form the core of its military.
“The overall commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces and the armed forces is Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani… We follow his instructions,” Fayyadh remarked.
As unexpected as his remarks were, the silence that followed them was also unexpected because other Shia leaders and the leaders of armed factions were supposed to respond angrily, but this never happened.
Odder still, the Hashd al-Shaabi was given the order to cancel its yearly parade honoring the anniversary of its founding later this month after Fayyadh’s speech in Mosul.
The order, which was given personally by Fayyadh, also included the cancellation of a military exercise planned for western Mosul to commemorate the event.
The military parade has been canceled, a senior PMA commander told reporters, and “everyone has been informed that the lack of funds and new units or weapons worthy of display is the reason for this.”.
“We all know that’s not true and that this issue has nothing to do with cost or weapons.”
The commander described the annual parade as “a display of power in front of friend and foe.”
“Refusals based on flimsy and false pretenses will undermine the morale of the fighters,” he said. “The cost doesn’t exceed $3 million and there’s a lot to show about the gun.”
The commander said Hashd al-Shaabi’s forces had recently received new armored vehicles, drones, Russian-made weapons (including the S-400 anti-aircraft system he claimed) and many other weapons, which he said were He said he was ready to show off. They are participating in this parade.
“So it has nothing to do with the cost or availability of weapons,” he said.
Fayyadh told his commanders a few days after the Mosul conference that he wanted them to cut back on anniversary celebrations and avoid media appearances.
It is undoubtedly a baffling image, and inquiries regarding the PMA’s operations are raised.
Are these improvements the consequence of contention among Fayyadh and heads of the outfitted groups over his situation? Or is it evidence that the Hashd al-Shaabi is in fact in its “second stage of establishment,” as Fayyadh referred to the process of regularizing the force?
